In this paper I attempt to help clarify the nature of structuralism as a philosophical approach by examining the way in which Freud, Llvi-Strauss and Chomsky use the concept of structure.
The discussion which follows does lead to such a suggestion.
Specifically, I will suggest that Freud, L^vi-Strauss and Chomsky are paradigm structuralists. Obviously, the reason for choosing these three has nothing to do with any declared adherence to a structural ist point of view.
Also, there may be something a bit odd about including Freud as a structuralist; it may be a tail wagging the dog situation.
Certainly from some points of view it would be more appropriate to consider structural ism as one of the offshoots of Freudian thought. However there may be some value to ignoring any possible lines of influence or intellectual debt that may exist among the three in order to look at what seems to me to be an interesting similarity among them; a similarity which centers on their use of structural concepts. The similarity is interesting partly because of the light it sheds on their work and partly because of what it indicates about the concept of structure.
To show that there is indeed something in common in the way they use structural concepts is the main burden of the paper.
I will argue, first, that there is a very strong tension in the ordinary as well as the technical use of the term structure.
Secondly, I will suggest that Freud, Llvi-Strauss and Chomsky share a certain fundamental tension in their thought, and that in each case the tension inherent in the concept of structure is what made a structural approach so amenable to their purpose. That is, in the case of all three, it is the use of structural concepts as basic which enables the two sides of their thinking to avoid coming into direct confrontation with each other.
To be a structuralist is, perhaps more than anything else, to believe it a good thing for such con frontations not to take place.
II. The Term "Structure"
Let me begin with a bit of ordinary language philoso phizing about the term "structure".
I might sum up what I wish to say about it by saying that it is schizophrenic. What I mean to say is that the term structure has two distinguishable personalities, but that they are so closely related that they remain confined within the same head.
Both personalities can be illustrated by thinking of someone standing in front of one of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and saying "What an interesting structure!". Now in one sense of the word structure what he is referring to is the actual glass, metal and concrete that he sees.
In this sense 91 the terms "structure" and "building" are nearly synonymous (indeed, the word "structure" derives from the Latin "struere", to build^). In this sense of the term the two towers, although they look exactly alike, are, nevertheless, different structures.
Thus in one of its personalities the term structure refers to something concrete and particular. But even when we use the term in this way, the choice of the term structure rather than, say, building, is significant.
Even though we are referring to something concrete, we are emphasizing that there is something about its form that we find interesting.
We would never refer to something as a structure unless it had at least a fairly complex and interesting form.
The other personality of structure reverses these two emphases.
That is, it refers to something formal and abstract, although emphasizing that we believe it to be embodied.
In this case, typically, we refer not to "structures" but to "structures of...".
For example, Ernest Nagel's book on The Structure of Science is about the logical form of science. In this sense the term structure refers to something essentially abstract -a repeatable universal.
This sense of the word enables us to say "These two buildings have the same structure". And, equivocating between the two meanings of the term we can say, quite sensibly, "These two structures have the same structure".
But again, this abstract sense of structure is not one which can be completely separated from its othefc sense.
When we wish to speak of a structure as completely abstracted from anything concrete, we more naturally use a word like form.
We use "structure" in its abstract sense when, although we wish to refer to some thing abstract, we are interested also in it embodiment.
The fact that structure is a schizophrenic term is, of course, no reason to avoid using it; its peculiarities might make it a uniquely useful concept. This is exactly the case, for example, with the mathematical concept of the infinitesimal, which is schizophrenic to the point of being an outright contradiction.
Even if recent work has succeeded in showing that the infinitesimal is not indispensable in mathematics, it certainly would have been a shame if Berkeley's criticism had prevailed and the development of calculus had been cut off at its inception.
But we should at least be as careful as possible in the presence of such concepts and try not to let their internal tension do any damage.
In particular p L a n e , p . 19.
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it seems to me important to keep in mind the following. In one of its senses the term structure refers to a concrete particular. In this sense of the term one can talk of two structures as being homologous.
This means that the two structures have the same form.
In its other sense it refers to a repeatable universal.
In this sense any two structures whihh are homologous are the same structure. Also in this sense, though not in its other sense, a struclitire can be embodied.
I call the term structure schizophrenic rather than just ambiguous because there are two ways in which its different senses are related that is not usually the case with the different senses of ambiguous terms.
First, the use of the term in one sense usually carries a strong connotation of its other sense. Second, the two senses are connected by the relation of embodiment.
That is, the entity referred to by one sense is always the embodiment of the entity referred to by the other sense.
It seems to me that this tension in the ordinary use of the term is reflected in philosophically serious discussion of what the term structure means.
One partic ularly clear and interesting such discussion is Peter Caws' paper "Operational, Representational, and Explana tory Models".
The use of the term structure by Caws in this paper seems to reflect exactly the tension discussed so far.
The tension involves the use of the term to refer, on the one hand, to an abstract universal, and on the other hand, to a concrete particular.
At the beginning of the paper, when Caws is defining terms, we get a clear impression that structures are abstract entities. Structures are defined as sets of relations and relations, surely, are abstract entities.
Also enhancing an abstract reading for "structure" at this point is Caws' statement that "to make the structural features of the model central reflects the fact that it stands for the relationships between the entities that constitute the system, rather than for the entities themselves." Soon after this, however, a shift takes place following which structures are concrete particulars.
The shift takes place in the course of one sentence which reads: "In one sense, of course, there is no such thing as an abstract structure, since as soon as it is specified the structure is auto matically embodied, in a dusl sense: in language and as part of the mental structure of the person or persons who perform or take note of the specification."^ Now the sense Mental structures. Now in the phrase "mental structure" the term structure must refer to a concrete entity since it is the embodiment of an abstract one.
What Caws takes to be important about these mental structures is that they model other structures and so he begins to call them models.
The word "model" has an even more concrete ring to it than the word "structure" and the way in which Caws talks about models strengthens this interpretation.
Take, for example, his discussion of Leach's remark that models are logical constructions in the anthropologist's mind.
Caws agrees with Leach that it would be "disconcerting" for a theory to be nowhere, although he argues that it makes more sense to speak of them ss in "heads" rather than "minds". But if models were abstract then they would not be constructions in the mind; they would be constructions of the mind. My point is that it is only disconcerting for them to be nowhere if they are thought of as concrete.
If they were abstract it would be equally disconcerting for them to be somewhere. Thus, although Caws wants to say thst structures are sets of relations, not things, mental structures seem to be particular things, locatable in people's heads. Although I will argue later that the work of L6vi-Strauss exhibits a basic tension that has nothing to with what he says about the word structure, still, wren he does talk about the term I think we can perceive the same tension we have been discussing.
The clearest expression of this is his view that the very distinction between form and content is antithetical to structuralism.
He says "form is defined by its opposition to a content which is foreign to it; but structure hss no distinct content. It is the content itself apprehended in a logical organization, conceived as a property of the real". I do not think, though, that one csn get rid of the form-content distinct ion so easily.
Any distinction which was fundamental to the the thinking of Aristotle and part of the working apparatus of most philosophers since, will not be so easily displaced.
In any case, in I.4vi-Strauss' actual work, and in the work of French structuralists generally, I find more of an equivocation between structure as form and structure as content than any real synthesis, fhe structuralists use the term structure to refer to two very different kinds of things; formal theories con structed by the social scientist, and the things in people's minds which these theories model. One of the points of Caws' paper discussed above is to argue that these two things are not so different as they might seem. He points out that although we often speak of the ''model" as opposed to the "real" thing, that actually the model is Just as real ss what it m o d e l s .f While I do feel that this is an important point to make, I still maintain that there is an important difference between a model and the thing it models: a model is abstract and the thing it models is concrete.
The fact the the term structure can be used for both is due precisely to the fact that it is ambiguous between form and content. This dual usage can be seen clearly in Levi-Strauss. On the one hand we have the view expressed in the often quoted statement: "It should be kept in mind that what makes social-structure studies valuable is that structures are models, the formal properties of which can be compared independently of their ilements". This asserts quite clearly that social scientists create something formal. Saying that the social scientist deals with something which can be considered independently of its elements (i.e. content) is certainly not overcoming the formcontent distinction; it constitutes adopting a formalist position.
Indeed, this aspect of what Livi-Strauss says is quite in accord with the views of people who are closer to formalism, such as Edmund Leach.
Leach is quite in favor of using formal models as one element in the comparative study of certain aspects of society such as kinship systems.
But there is an important difference between Leach and Levi-Strauss in their views on what can be accomplished by these formal models.
L$vi-Strauss feels that they can, ultimately, give a full accounting of social reality while Leach assigns them a much more modest mission -they are only a convenient device for organizing our knowledge.
Leach argues that the total analysis of social reality "must always take into account the whole range of institutional dimensions with which the anthropologist has to deal and must start from a concrete reality -a local group of people -rather than from an abstract reality -such as the concept of lineage or the notion of a kinship system."^ Now why is it that LeviStrauss disagrees with this and feels that formal models 7 'Caws, p. 1. can give a full accounting of social reality? I think the answer is accurately given by Nathan Rotenstreich in his paper "On L §vi-Strauss' Concept of Structure" when he points out that for L&vi-Strauss the models of the anthropologist model another kind of structure; concrete "built-in" structures which exist in the people under study snd which, though unconscious, actually form the basis for their behavior.
In other words, the anthropologist is not so much inventing a model which conveniently summarizes an aspect of social reality, as he is discovering some thing concrete, something already there. L^vi-Strauss puts it this way: "If, as we believe, the unconscious activity of the reason consists in imposing forms upon content, and if these forms are fundamentally the same for all who possess this faculty...it is both necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure which underlies each institution or custom in order to provide a principle of interpretation which.is valid for other institutions and other customs..." Thus I think it would not be unfair to sum up Llvi-Strauss' use of the concept of structure (which I take to be illustrative of French structuralism generally) in the following way. There are two kinds of things to which the term structure applies: concrete things in the minds (unconsciously) of the people under study and the abstract models created by the social scientist. But of course these two things are closely related. They are related by what might be called a modeling relation. While a full analysis of exactly what the nature of this relation is certainly requires more discussion that I will provide here, it seems to me that it is not significantly different from some of the more traditional kinds of relations. If we think in terms of a universal-particular distinction then each of the individual unconscious mental structures is an instant iation of the abstract theory. If we think of the formcontent distinction then the unconscious mental structures are the content and the abstract theory is the form of social reality. I want to make clear that I do not feel there is any thing wrong with LSvi-Strauss' use of the concept of structure. I think it is perfectly coherent and sound. I disagree only with his statement that he has overcome the form-content distinction. He has neither overcome it nor is there any need to overcome it. As long as one is clear about the tension inherent in the concept of structure there is no reason why its peculiarities should not be exploited. Of course if one is not clear about it the result can be a very confused kind of view. Take, for example, the following statements by Jean Piaget (I do not wish to suggest that the views of Piaget, in general, are confused, but I do think there is something wrong with the statements which follow: "If the character of structured wholes depends on their laws of composition, these laws must of their very nature be structuring: it is the constant duality or bipolarity, of always being simultaneously structuring and structured that accounts for the success of the.notlon of law or rule employed by the structural ists."1 And also: "...structures are not simply con venient theoretical constructs; they exist apart from the anthropologist, for they are the source of the relations he observes; a structure would lose all truth value if ,, it did not have this direct connection with the facts."13 While this at least represents an attempt at a genuine synthesis of form and content, it seems to me to result in mere confusion. In Levi-Strauss we can distinguish between the two kinds of things that constitute the two aspects of structure; things in the minds of those under study and things constructed by the social scientist. In Piaget's terms the former is "structured" and the latter is "structuring"; the former "exists apart from the anthropologist", while the latter is dependent upon the anthropologist for its creation and has truth value. But what is the point of saying that these two kinds of things are the same thing? What kind of peculiar entity exists, at the same time, both as an abstract theory, a linguistic entity having truth value, and as a part of concrete reality? Of course one can study the scientist's theory itself as a part of social reality. But this is not what Piaget is talking about. It is the conflation of a theory and what the theory is about that I find utterly con fusing. It seems to me that in providing a foundation for social science we can do just as well by simply thinking of the term structure as having two closely related but distinguishable senses. So, to sum up, there is a basic tension in the term structure. In one sense it refers to something abstract and formal; in the other sense it refers to something concrete and particular. Most uses seem ultimately to be A-13 97 a esse of one sense or the other, but the two senses are never completely separable; whichever sense is mainly intended, a strong connotation of the other sense persists. The term structure may not be the ' only term which behaves this way. Other terms, say "organization", also share these characteristics to some extent. But the term structure is uniquely impdrtant because it is the term whose peculiarities have been richly exploited by a number of thinkers; most importantly Freud, L&vi-Strauss and Chomsky.
III. The Theory of Meanings
Freud, L&vi-Strauss and Chomsky have a great deal in common aside from the fact that they have all, in one context or another, been referred to as structuralists. Although each is associated with one of the sciences con cerned with man, all three have written on much broader philosophical issues, and have had an influence with an audience that goes way beyond their special fields. In fact it has occasionally been said of each of them that their most important contribution has more to do with this broadly philosophical work than with their technical discoveries. In addition, all three see psychology as in some sense the most basic of the human sciences. More specifically, all three have done their most important work, after the pioneering by Freud, in the area of that aspect of the mind of which a person is not normally aware. But perhaps the most striking similarity is that all three have two basic aspects to their thought between which there is at least a tension and at most a serious conflict. I would characterize these aspects, in general, as follows. The second aspect of their work has to do with their committment to be scientifically rigorous. In all three cases this is expressed as some kind of determinism. For Freud it is his theory of instincts, the interplay of various forces within the psychic apparatus. For L&vi-Strauss it is his adherance to the philosophical views of materialism and determinism, made lucid by his re curring thermodynamic metaphor for social phenomena. For Chomsky it is his view that the capacity for language is innate; part of the genetic make-up of the human species. I will discuss the role played by the concept of structure in this aspect of their work in the next section of the paper. I will now discuss the role played by the concept of structure in the theory of meanings in Freud, LSviStrauss and Chomsky.
What kind of a basic, primitive, concept is required for this aspect of their work? It seems to me that what ever concept is taken as basic would have to be abstract. This is true not merely because meanings themselves are abstract sorts of things, but also for a more important reason. For all three thinkers the meanings they are working with are meanings of which the person who has them is not normally aware. The meaning of dreams and errors, the meaning of myths, kinship systems, etc., and the rules which constitute the deep structure of language, all share the property of residing primarily in the unconscious. Now there is a prima facie problem with the notion of unconscious mental entities. All of the arguments in favor of mental entities as some sort of ultimate category which is not reducible to the category of physical things derive their strength from the fact that we are aware of our own minds directly and not, as in the case of physical things, through the intervention of the senses. But if this is so, how can we divide the mind in such a way that one part of it is, by definition, not directly available to our awareness? It certainly makes sense to talk of things going on in the brain of which we are not aware, but it is not so clear that it makes sense to talk about things going on in the mind of which we are not aware. In one of the early analytic critiques of the concept of the unconscious, C. D. Broad argued persuasively that while there certainly are gaps in 14 See, for example, Victoria A. Fromkin, "Slips of the Tongue", Scientific American, December, 1973* consciousness, they can most plausibly by filled with,-physical processes, not unconscious mental entities. x:> This is a point which none of the people I sm dis cussing seem to take seriously. Chomsky, for example, says, "The greatest defect of classical philosophy of mind, both rationalist and empiricist, seems to me to be its unquestioned assumption that the properties and content of the mind are accessible to introspection; it is surprising to see^how rarely this assumption has been challenged..." Chomsky, however, does not seem to be prepared to confront the reasons why the assumption seemed, for so long, to be eminently sensible.
Freud also seems to me to dismiss the philosophical problems connected with the concept of the unconscious too quickly. At one point he rejects the kind of argument expressed by C. D. Broad with these words:
At this very point we msy be prepared to meet with the philosophical objection that the latent conception did not exist as an object of psychol ogy, but as a physical disposition for the recurrence of the same psychical phenomenon, i.e. of the said conception. But we may reply that this is a theory far overstepping the domain of psychology proper; that it simply begs the question by asserting "conscious" to be an identical term with "mental" and that it is clearly at fault in denying psychology the right to account for its most common facts, such as memory, by its own means. ' Claiming territorial "rights" for psychology, however, is hardly a serious philosophical argument. At another point Freud says, "To most people Mho have been educated in philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is not also conscious is so inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and refutable simply by logic. I believe this is only because they have never studied the relevant phenomena of hypnosis and dreams. In Newtonian physics the concept of force is justified not because it is required by common sense. On the contrary, the concept of force is quite problematical since it seems to be just a device to get around the injunction against action at a distance. Its justification lies rather in its richness and power within the system of Newtonian physics. In other sciences, though, the notion of force may not be useful enough to justify its use as a basic concept, and then it becomes merely occult. Rather than trying to force other sciences into the Newtonian frame work, they should work within the Newtonian analogy, that is, to follow its example and try to develop their own concepts on the basis of what has the greatest richness and power. It seems to me that the notion of an unconscious mental entity is just such a concept. Obviously the crime was committed by a thief, even though loneliness and darkness may have been contributing factors. Similarly, if we wish to explain an error, we must look beyond the external factors which accompanied the error, and may have been a con tributing faetor, to its basic cause: the unconscious motivation which lay behind it. What I find interesting is that in telling this little story, Freud makes a person analogous to the unconscious. Freud, it must be said, does reject the view that the unconscious ought to While I do not think that Harmon succeeds in showing that Chomsky's view is incoherent, or even implausible, I do think that his argument points to something in Chomsky's approach which does require further discussion. One of Harmon's points is that if we assume a person is born with a theory of language, then this theory must be presented within some metalanguage. But we can now apply the same argument to the metalanguage so we get an infinite regress of languages which the person must be born with if he is to be born with any language at all. Chomsky argues that this conclusion does not follow even if we assume that "the innate schematism must be represented in an 'innate language'". He says that the "child must know this 'innate language', in Harmon's terms, but it does not follow that he must 'speak and understand it'". ' Now what can it mean to say that a person knows a language if not that he can speak and understand it? Indeed, when we say a person knows a language we seem to mean precisely that. In his early work, the term "unconscious" appears mainly as an adjective; it refers to a property which a mental entity may or may not have. Unconsciousness conceived in this way, however, began to seem to him too abstract. To correct this he introduced the more concrete notion of "the system Ucs". The excessive concreteness of this approach, though, created other problems. It seems to me that the bssic purpose of the "structural" meta psychology presented in The Ego and the Id is to strike a balance between an overly abstract and an overly concrete notion of the unconscious. He wants to emphasize that although he is talking about concrete entities, it is the relationships among the entities rather than the entities themselves which are most important.
IV. The Theory of Determinism
But Freud, Levi-Strauss and Chomsky also have another side to their intellectual personalities and the conceptual framework they employ must be adequate to it also. It is often pointed out that Freud's intellectual roots w|ge in the Helmholtz school of "Physicalistic Physiology". This school was committed to placing psychology within, to use Chomsky's phrase, the Newtownian framework. To accomplish this Freud divised the notion of the psychic apparatus. Its purpose is to serve as a surrogate for an inertial system. In Freud's first major (although initially unpublished) work, the Project of a Scientific Psychology, the psychic apparatus is made up of explicitly physical forces. In later work this was trans lated into psychical forces but their interplay remains deterministic. Furthermore, it is goal oriented, in Freud's early work, only in the sense that it inevitably tends toward a state of quiescence; its purpose is to abolish disturbing stimuli. The actual way in which it works was often to change. He emphasized at various times sex alone, then sex versus aggression, a life instinct versus a death instinct, the pleasure principle, etc. But what remained constant is that Freud saw the psychic apparatus as a deterministic system; the arena in which there is 8 constant interplay of forces.
We have in the thought of Levi-Strauss also a determin istic side which tends to see the world within the frame work of classical physics. Just as Freud sees the essential teleology of the nervous system as tending toward a state of quiescence, Lgvi-Strauss sees the same thing holding true for society in general. He says: "Man's role is itself a machine, brought perhaps to a greater point of perfection than any other, whose activity hastens the disintegration of an initial order and precipitates a powerfully organized matter towards a condition of inertia which grows even greater, and will one day prove definitive." ~ "Hot" societies are unstable and go through the process quickly and explosively while "cool" societies are relatively stable and go through the process more slowly. But all societies are ultimately part of the physical world and subject to the laws of thermodynamics. It is not clear to me just how much of this is intended by Levi-Strauss to be taken literally, but even to the extent that it is a metaphor it reflects a decidedly deterministic point of view.
And with Chomsky we have the view that the fundamental structure of language is part of the genetic make-up of the human species. Chomsky feels that we have begun to see that there are certain universal properties of all human languages. He argues that the universality of such features can only be accounted for by holding them to be innate; part of our biology. It would be as appropriate 'Levi-Strauss, quoted by Yankelovich and Barrett, p. 302. for Chomsky to say that some day biology might replace linguistics as it was for Freud to say that some day bio logy might replace psychology. Thus Chomsky, as well as Freud and Levi-Strauss, has a side to his thinking that emphasizes the existence of something concrete. The universals of language may be formal universals, but they are instantiated within each individual as part of his genetic make-up. However, in the case of all three, what is important is not so much the biology or physics of the elements in their system but the relations among the elements. The problem is that in all three cases, not much is known about these relations. The "forces" of Freud's psychic apparatus must be thought of as actually existing and yet they are rather hard to pin down. They can not be measured and the fact that their use as explanatory factors often seems quite ad hoc is a common criticism of psychoanalysis. L^vi-Strauss* concept of "hot" and "cool" societies is open to the same criticism. We can not really measure the temperature of a society and any attempt to use this distinction to explain differences among societies is surely ad hoc. And with Chomsky we have talk of universal principles of human language, but we still know practically nothing of their neurophysiolog ical manifestation. In any case what is important about this aspect of the work of all three is that we can, as our knowledge develops, learn about the relations among the concrete elements that make up these determin istic systems. Thus what is needed is a basis for the conceptual framework which, while it actually refers to concrete things, emphasizes that it is the relations among them that we find interesting. So again, the concept of structure, in this case its concrete sense, is exactly what is needed.
V. Conclusion
In the account of structuralism I have given I have emphasized a number of points which are not usually emphasized in discussions of French structuralism and I have also neglected a number of views and tendencies which are usually held central to what structuralism is. I would like to make a few comments about how two such points might relate to structuralism as I see it. The first is that an interest in language, and more basically, how signs and symbols operate in general, seems to be present in all those who have been even vaguely associated with structuralism. My suggestion is that perhaps this fact, and the emphasis of those who I consider paradigm structuralists on the unconscious may be more closely related than they seem at first glance. Perhaps 106 the discovery of the unconscious did for linguistics what the discovery of non-Euclidian geometries did for logic.
That is, the discovery of the coherence of nonEuclidian systems took mathematics so far from its intuitive foundations that an intensive study of the logic of mathematical thought was required to keep mathematics well grounded.
Perhaps in a similar way, the discovery of meanings in the unconscious took linguistics so far from its intuitive foundations, the corpus of what people actually say, that the need was felt for a more basic study of the logic of meaningful signs.
Second is the emphasis among French structuralists on synchronic rather than diachronic systems.
This clearly has to do with the deterministic side of structuralist thought.
Perhaps it is a sort of philosophical injunction against action at a (temporal) distance.
That is, a way of saying that what interests us about the past is only those things which have manifested themselves in some way in the present.
Seeing it this way might help to incorporate Freud into a structuralist framework.
The most apparent disparity between Freud and the French structuralists is the strongly genetic, developmental, tendency in Freud's thought, and the fact that in practice psychoanalysis is quite backward looking. But for Freud this backward looking is a means to an end. What really interests Freud is something which exists right now but is being repressed.
If there were some quick way of bringing it to consciousness Freud would undoubt edly have much less interest in the long process of going back to the time when it was first repressed.
This whole line of thought in Freud originated in his attempt to cure hysterical symptoms.
Joseph Breuer reported an incident in which a patient's symptoms vanished when she was able to recall, under hypnosis, what she hadQfelt during the incident when the symptoms appeared. This gave Freud the insight which led to the development of the basic techniques of psychoanalysis.
The point is that Freud was attracted to this approach only because it succeeded in relieving a present symptom. 
